Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court without any further corroboration: Supreme Court
While hearing the Naeem vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh case on March 05, 2024, the Supreme Court (SC) stated that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. It also added that “Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.” The SC further said that “it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” During the proceedings, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice BR Gavai opined that if after scrutiny, the court is satisfied that the mentioned dying declaration is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if the same is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.
The judgment was delivered in a case where a written report was received by the Police Station which was a transcription of the complaint made by Shahin Parveen (deceased) who had been admitted to the District Hospital, Moradabad with 80% deep thermal and facial burns. In her complaint, the deceased had alleged that “she had been set ablaze by the accused/appellants who had been pressuring her into entering the profession of immoral trafficking and prostitution”. An FIR was registered at Police Station Katghar, District Moradabad for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, based on the written report. Between the hours, the dying declaration of Shahin Parveen (deceased) came to be recorded by Raj Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5). Subsequently, the victim was admitted to Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi on 2nd December 2016, where she eventually succumbed to her injuries. Consequently, the case was altered to the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
According to the Post-Mortem Report, the cause of death was shock as a result of antemortem burn injuries. As per the complaint and dying declaration of the deceased, she was set on fire by her brother-in-law (Pappi), his wife (Naeema), and Naeema’s brother (Naeem). The trial court found that the prosecution had proved the case against the accused/appellants beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted them for offences punishable under IPC. The HC by the impugned judgment dismissed the same and affirmed the order of conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court. The matter was therefore listed before the Supreme Court.
The SC bench said “We have no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact that the dying declaration is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement. The dying declaration is coherent and consistent and as such, there should be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction without there being any independent corroboration. We find that the dying declaration is cogent, trustworthy, and reliable to base the conviction on the same.” After hearing the matter, the bench observed that the statement of the victim revealed that the motive attributed by the deceased was related to Pappi (devar). It also opined that the other two accused, Naeema and her brother Naeem, the statement of the victim only states that they aided her devar.
The bench said that though the said dying declaration could be the sole basis of maintaining the conviction of Pappi, in the absence of any specific role attributed to Naeema and Naeem, they were entitled to the benefit of doubt. Thus in the result, the Criminal Appeal of appellant Naeem and the Criminal Appeal of appellant Naeema were allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and maintained by the HC were quashed and set aside. Furthermore, the Criminal Appeal of appellant Pappi was dismissed.
