Supreme Selections: Top Supreme Court Judgments of July 2024

31 July, 2024

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Overview of July Month

In July 2024, the Supreme Court (SC) delivered a total of 98 judgments including around 80 reportable judgments after it re-opened on July 08 (summer vacations). Let us explore some of the important decisions of the top court in July month in detail.

Important Verdicts of July Month

Sharing Google PIN Location Cannot be a Condition to grant bail

Judgment Name: Frank Vitus vs. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.

Bench: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Articles and Acts Involved: {Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985- Sections 8, 22, 23, and 29}

Judgment Brief and Decision: In this case, the Supreme Court was hearing the matter related to a bail condition requiring an accused to share his Google PIN location with the investigating officer. The bench also considered whether sharing of location violates a person’s right to privacy. The top court held that a court cannot impose a condition on an accused seeking bail to share his Google PIN location with authorities for continuous monitoring. On July 08, the judgment passed by the two-judge bench of the SC said, “There can't be bail condition defeating the very objective of bail. There can't be a bail condition enabling the police to constantly track the movement of the accused and virtually peep into the private life of the accused.” It added, “Imposing any bail condition which enables the Police/Investigation Agency to track every movement of the accused released on bail by using any technology or otherwise would undoubtedly violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21.”

Maintenance is not Charity but Right

Judgment Name: Mohd. Abdul Samad vs. The State of Telangana & Anr.

Bench: Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih

Articles and Acts Involved: {Constitution of India, 1950- Articles 15 and 59}, {Indian Penal Code, 1860- Sections 498A and 406}, {Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 125 and 127}, { Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986- Sections 3 and 4}, and {Maintenance Under sec 125 of Crpc}

Judgment Brief and Decision: On July 10, 2024, the Supreme Court held that a divorced Muslim woman can seek maintenance from their husband by filing a petition for maintenance against him under Section 125 of the CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure). While dismissing a Muslim man’s (husband) petition challenging the order of the Telangana High Court that refused to interfere with the maintenance order of a family court, the bench said, “Maintenance is a facet of gender parity and enabler of equality, not charity.” The judges, in this case, gave separate but concurring judgments and highlighted the following points as a conclusion:

“Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all married women including Muslim married women.
Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all non-Muslim divorced women.
Insofar as divorced Muslim women are concerned, -
- Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all such Muslim women, married and divorced under the Special Marriage Act in addition to remedies available under the Special Marriage Act.
- If Muslim women are married and divorced under Muslim law then Section 125 of the CrPC as well as the provisions of the 1986 Act are applicable. Option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy under either of the two laws or both laws. This is because the 1986 Act is not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC but in addition to the said provision.
- If Section 125 of the CrPC is also resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as per the definition under the 1986 Act, then any order passed under the provisions of 1986 Act shall be taken into consideration under Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC.
The 1986 Act could be resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as defined under the said Act, by filing an application thereunder which could be disposed of in accordance with the said enactment.
In case of an illegal divorce as per the provisions of the 2019 Act then,
- relief under Section 5 of the said Act could be availed for seeking subsistence allowance or, at the option of such a Muslim woman, remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC could also be availed.
- If during the pendency of a petition filed under Section 125 of the CrPC, a Muslim woman is ‘divorced’ then she can take recourse under Section 125 of the CrPC or file a petition under the 2019 Act.
- The provisions of the 2019 Act provide remedy in addition to and not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC.”

Arvind Kejriwal bail in Delhi Liquor Scam Case

Judgment Name: Arvind Kejriwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement (July 12, 2024)

Bench: Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Dipankar Datta

Articles and Acts Involved: {Constitution of India, 1950- Articles 22(1), 226 and 227}, {The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 482}, {The Indian Penal Code, 1860- Section 120B read with Section 477A}, {The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988- Section 7}, {The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002- Section 19}, and {The Customs Act, 1962- Section 104}

Judgment Brief and Decision: The SC granted interim bail to Arvind Kejriwal in the case registered by the ED under the PMLA over the Delhi Liquor Policy Scam case and referred his petition challenging his arrest by the ED in the case to a larger bench. The bench ordered, “As we are referring the matter to a larger Bench, we have to, despite our findings on ‘reasons to believe’, consider whether interim bail should be granted to Arvind Kejriwal. Given the fact that right to life and liberty is sacrosanct, and Arvind Kejriwal has suffered incarceration of over 90 days, and that the questions referred to above require in-depth consideration by a larger Bench, we direct that Arvind Kejriwal may be released on interim bail in connection with case…, on the same terms as imposed vide the order dated 10.05.2024.” Further, the SC said, “We are conscious that Arvind Kejriwal is an elected leader and the Chief Minister of Delhi, a post holding importance and influence. We have also referred to the allegations. While we do not give any direction, since we are doubtful whether the court can direct an elected leader to step down or not function as the Chief Minister or as a Minister, we leave it to Arvind Kejriwal to take a call. Larger Bench, if deemed appropriate, can frame question(s) and decide the conditions that can be imposed by the court in such cases.” The questions of law for consideration by a larger Bench:

Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act?
Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case?
If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”?

Accused being an Elected Representative cannot be a testament to their image among the general public

Judgment Name: Shailendra Kumar Srivastava vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

Articles and Acts Involved: {The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 321}

Judgment Brief and Decision: On July 15, 2024, the SC ruled that the matter of a gruesome crime of double murder does not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground that the accused is an elected representative. It said, “Considering the material on record and the political influence of accused Chhote Singh and the Trial Court’s casual approach towards the accusations against the then sitting Member of Legislative Assembly in allowing withdrawal of his prosecution, this court is of the opinion that merely because an accused person is elected to the Legislative Assembly cannot be a testament to their image among the general public. Matters of a gruesome crime akin to the double murder in the present case do not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground of good public image of an accused named in the charge sheet after thorough investigation. Contrary to the Trial Court’s view, such withdrawal cannot be said to be allowed in public interest. This reasoning cannot be accepted especially in cases of involvement of influential people.” After hearing the matter, the bench set aside the withdrawal of prosecution of the accused Chhote Singh.

Promotion is Effective from the date it is Granted and not from the date when a Vacancy Occurs

Judgment Name: Bihar State Electricity Board and Others vs. Dharamdeo Das (July 23, 2024)

Bench: Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah

Articles and Acts Involved: {Constitution of India, 1950- Articles 14 and 16(1)}

Judgment Brief and Decision: In this case, the bench held that a promotion is effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. While hearing the matter, the SC observed, “No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself.” It also said, “...a right to be considered for promotion being a facet of the right to equal opportunity in employment and appointment, would have to be treated as a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India but such a right cannot translate into a vested right of the employee for being necessarily promoted to the promotional post, unless the rules expressly provide for such a situation.” The bench was hearing an appeal filed by the Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB) challenging the order of the Patna High Court (HC) that directed the BSEB to retrospectively promote an employee (respondent) to the position of Joint Secretary. Considering the facts of this case, the bench ordered, “The Resolution of the Board dated 26th December 1991 for fixing the Kal Awadhi was only directory in nature and cannot be treated as statutory for the respondent to have claimed an entitlement to promotion reckoned from 29th July 1997, instead of 5th March 2003. Such a view is in consonance with the settled legal position and cannot be faulted.”

No NEET-UG Re-test

Judgment Name: Vanshika Yadav vs. Union of India and Others

Bench: Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra

Articles and Acts Involved: {The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 226}

Judgment Brief and Decision: On July 23, 2024, the SC bench declined to cancel the entire NEET-UG exam stating that the evidence before the court was insufficient to show a widespread leak of the question paper. It said that no Re-test would be conducted. Considering the fact that the re-test will lead to serious consequences, the top court said, “The court is mindful of the fact directing a fresh exam would have serious consequences on students, including destruction of admission schedule, effects on education, and impact on availability of medical professionals in the future.” Further, it directed the NTA to revise the test results by treating the option approved by an expert team constituted by the IIT-Delhi as the only correct answer to an ambiguous question.

Release of Genetically Modified Mustard in the Environment

Judgment Name: Gene Campaign & Another vs. Union of India & Others

Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice BV Nagarathna

Articles and Acts Involved: {Constitution of India, 1950- Articles 14, 19, 21, 38, 47, 48, and 48-A read with Article 51-A(g)}, {The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006- Section 23}, and {The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986- Sections 6, 8 and 25}

Judgment Brief and Decision: The bench delivered a split decision on July 23, 2024, on petitions against the approval given by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) and the Union Government to release Genetically Modified Mustard (GM Mustard) into the environment. Justice Nagarathna quashed the approval given by the GEAC and the Ministry of Environment and Forests stating that the approval given by the GEAC regarding the environmental release of GM Mustard (the first transgenic food crop, transgenic mustard hybrid DMH-11) is vitiated and contrary to the principle of public interest. On the other hand, Justice Karol upheld the approval given by the GEAC stating that “The composition of the GEAC is in accordance with rules and therefore constitutional challenge will fail. The approval granted by GEAC is by an expert body and therefore, challenge to such approval cannot be allowed. It will fail.” After hearing the matter and highlighting their individual viewpoints, the SC bench directed the registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to constitute a larger bench to hear the matter afresh.

States have the Power to Levy Tax on Mineral Rights

Judgment Name: Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. vs. M/S Steel Authority of India & Anr etc.

Bench: Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice Abhay S Oka, Justice JB Pardiwala, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Justice Augustine George Masih, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice BV Nagarathna, Justice Manoj Misra, and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma.

Articles and Acts Involved: {The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957- Section 9}

Judgment Brief and Decision: In this case, the bench overruled its 1998 judgment in the India Cements case holding royalty to be a tax with a majority of 8:1. It held that ‘royalty’ is not the same as ‘tax’ and the States have the power to levy tax on mining and mineral-use activities. The majority ruled, “The legislative power to tax mineral rights lies with the State legislature and the Parliament does not have the legislative competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 of List 1 since it is a general entry and Parliament cannot use its residuary power regarding this subject matter…” Justice Nagarathna, in her dissenting opinion said, “I hold royalty is in nature of the tax. States have no legislative competence to impose any tax or fee on mineral rights. Entry 49 is not related to mineral-bearing lands. I hold India cement decision was correctly decided.” The decision was delivered on July 25, 2024.

Bar Councils cannot charge enrolment fees more than specified under the Advocates Act

Judgment Name: Gaurav Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors.

Bench: Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justice JB Pardiwala

Articles and Acts Involved: {The Advocates Act 1961- Section 24(1)(f)}

Judgment Brief and Decision: On July 30, 2024, the SC ruled that the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India (BCI) cannot charge enrolment fees for advocates beyond the express legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961. While stating this, the bench observed, “Section 24(1)(f) is a fiscal regulatory provision and has to be construed strictly. Parliament has prescribed the enrolment fees in the exercise of its sovereign legislative powers. The SBCs and the BCI, being delegates of Parliament, cannot alter or modify the fiscal policy laid down by Parliament.” Concluding the judgment, the top court bench said that the decision will have a prospective effect which means the State Bar Councils are not required to refund the excess enrolment fees collected before the date of this judgment (July 30).